Hawzah News Agency- In a note published by Al-Ahd, retired Brig. Gen. Munir Shehadeh, former Lebanese government coordinator in the International Emergency Forces and former head of the military court, analyzed the performance of Lebanese media in constructing narratives under the direction of political parties aligned with the Western-American and Arab-Zionist axis.
The following is a translation of his remarks:
The War of Narratives
The war against Lebanon is no longer fought only with missiles, aircraft, and tanks. Another war is underway — quieter, but equally dangerous: the war of narratives. In this war, there is no need to occupy territory to change the image of what happens there, and no need to seize a military position to destroy its meaning.
It is enough to have a media platform, a network of digital accounts, and a group of commentators and experts capable of recycling news to turn a claim into a reality in the public consciousness.
A question must be seriously asked in Lebanon: Who funds some of these media outlets? Who sets their priorities? Who determines the limits of what they say and what they ignore? Are we dealing with media performing their natural role of conveying facts, or with part of a broader system to influence Lebanese public opinion?
This is not a theoretical hypothesis. A study titled "Monitoring Media Ownership in Lebanon," launched by the Samir Kassir Foundation in 2024 and covering 37 media outlets, found that about 90 percent of them do not disclose their funding sources, while more than 80 percent are linked through ownership or shares to the Lebanese political class. More than 70 percent of media owners in the sample are linked to elected or appointed politicians.
These figures alone show that the problem of Lebanese media is not only "fake news," but also the system of interests behind news production and the framing of its presentation.
Foreign Funding and the Question of Intent
The claim that foreign financial support in Lebanon is merely a rumor or a political invention is wrong. Declared and documented international funding exists for institutions and programs related to media and journalism.
For example, the European Union has funded the Samir Kassir Award for Press Freedom since 2006 and stated in an official explanation that the project's budget is 140,000 euros annually. The EU continued launching the award in 2026 in cooperation with the Samir Kassir Foundation.
In 2025, a Samir Kassir Foundation report on the impact of the suspension of US government funding showed that a number of Lebanese media institutions surveyed were directly affected by the US funding freeze, and that government grants were the most common source of income among the institutions included in the study.
A distinction must be made: the existence of foreign funding is not in itself proof of a hidden agenda. But the lack of transparency about funding sources raises legitimate questions about the nature of the relationship between the funder and the beneficiary, and whether the funding is limited to professional support or extends, directly or indirectly, to influencing editorial priorities.
When finance becomes part of the narrative industry, the problem is not simply that a foreign entity gives money to a media outlet. The problem begins when this funding becomes part of an integrated system that includes training, research, content production, digital platforms, research centers, and communication campaigns — and then the dissemination of the same messages across multiple channels and media. At that point, the effect no longer requires direct instructions.
It is enough for a group of institutions to have the same priorities, the same vocabulary, the same terminology, and the same approaches. The most dangerous forms of influence may be those that do not require anyone to tell a journalist "write this." It is enough for a journalist to already know what gets funded, what attracts international attention, what can open doors, and what might close them.
Half-Truths and Selective Coverage
Inflammatory media do not always lie; sometimes they choose half the truth. The most dangerous form of incitement is not necessarily the production of baseless, fabricated news. The most dangerous type of media takes a truth, removes half of it, places it in a different context, and repeats it dozens of times until the incomplete truth becomes a complete narrative.
A military event may occur in the south, and the headline becomes about "Hezbollah's weapons." An Israeli attack may occur, and the media question becomes: "Why didn't Hezbollah prevent the war?" An Israeli infiltration may occur, and the story turns into a debate about the resistance's responsibility. Thus, media truth is gradually manufactured.
Media incitement begins when outlets stop reporting an event and push people toward a specific position on it. When certain terms become a fixed part of news coverage, the reader is not required to think, but to accept: "illegal weapons," "a state within a state," "Iranian occupation," "an adventure."
Lebanese media have thus become parallel political and sectarian islands, where each audience sees a Lebanon different from the one seen by other audiences. The problem of "biased media" is not new, but social media has given it double power.
From Screens to Cyber Armies
Public opinion in Lebanon is no longer formed solely in newsrooms. Accounts, groups, influencers, pages, platforms, campaigns, and trends can all move in one direction and create the impression that a particular position represents the views of all Lebanese. Here the question becomes more complex: Does public opinion make media discourse, or does coordinated media discourse make public opinion?
Indicators of Foreign Influence
If we want to look for serious signs of foreign influence, we should not only look at direct financial transfers to a media outlet. Other indicators can be monitored:
First: Funding sources. Does the organization clearly disclose who funds it? How much is the funding? How long is the project? Who is the implementing body?
Second: The nature of programs. Is the funding allocated to developing journalism, research, and training, or is it linked to specific political topics?
Third: Partner networks. Who funds the institution? Who trains its staff? Who selects the experts? Who determines which studies are produced?
Fourth: Repeated vocabulary. Do the same political terms appear simultaneously across a wide range of platforms?
Fifth: Selective coverage. Are certain events excessively magnified while other similar events are ignored?
Sixth: Speed of narrative spread. Does the reader know where the news ends and political interpretation begins?
These are indicators that can be examined professionally. However, turning them directly into accusations of espionage or servitude, without providing financial or documentary evidence, is not professional journalism.
The Problem Is Not Only Foreign
In fairness, not all blame should be placed on foreign forces. Lebanese media themselves suffer from a long-standing problem: the influence of local political money. Some outlets are linked to businessmen, politicians, and political parties, while others rely on advertising, political, or commercial interests that call their editorial independence into question.
Reporters Without Borders notes that Lebanon's media sector, to varying degrees, remains subordinate to individuals linked to political parties or political and economic families, and that media reflect political and sectarian divisions in the country.
Lebanon does not need media without a position. It needs media that disclose their position. The goal is not to empty Lebanese media of opinion. Media have the right to support or oppose the resistance, to approach the West or reject its policies, to support or criticize the government. The problem is not taking a position. The problem is hiding that position behind a claim of neutrality, hiding funding behind a claim of independence, and hiding opinion behind a news headline.
The Lebanese reader has the right to know: Who owns this media outlet? Who funds it? Who pays for the studies it produces? Who finances the training programs? Who funds the digital campaigns? And what is the nature of the relationship between the funder and the content?
In this context, the passage of a new media law in Lebanon in August 2026, which includes increased transparency regarding media ownership and funding sources, despite reservations, represents an official acknowledgment that this issue is a fundamental part of a healthy media environment.
The Real Battle Is for the Lebanese Mind
In major wars, the primary goal may be the seizure of territory. But in Lebanon, there is another goal equally important: the awareness of the Lebanese people of what is happening around them. If one side succeeds in convincing Lebanese that the aggressor is the victim, that the victim is the problem, that the resistance is the root of the war, and that the occupation is merely its consequence — or exactly the opposite — then it has achieved part of its objectives without firing a single bullet.
Confronting inflammatory media is not achieved by silencing the media, preventing the expression of opposing views, or accusing journalists of treason. It involves exposing money. Exposing ownership. Exposing interests. Distinguishing fact from opinion.
Media independence is not measured by how often an organization declares itself "independent," but by its ability to disclose its funding sources and its willingness to publish the truth, even when that truth embarrasses its supporters.
In a small country like Lebanon, surrounded by crises, wars, and divisions, we cannot leave public opinion hostage to those who control the money, the screen, the platform, or the algorithm. The battle for Lebanon may begin at the borders, but it is often decided in the minds of citizens.
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